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INTRODUCTION 
Privacy occupies a central place in the western liberal tradition 
as an essential component of self-definition and individual 
development.1  The meaning of privacy, however, has proven elusive.  
Legal scholars and philosophers have variously characterized privacy 
as a social situation of autonomy, a claim, a psychological state, a 
physical area, or a form of control.2  More specific definitions 
include: privacy as a psychological condition of  “being apart from 
others,”3 “freedom not to participate in the activities of others,”4 “a 
social ritual by means of which an individual’s moral title to his 
existence is conferred,”5 “a boundary through which information 
does not flow from the persons who possess it to others,”6 “the state of 
limited access by others . . . to certain modes of being in a person’s 
life,”7 “the exclusive right to dispose of access to one’s property 
(private) domain,”8 “intermediate goods”9 involving the “concealment 
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 1 See generally ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1968).  For a thorough 
review of recent legal and philosophical critiques of privacy, see JUDITH WAGNER 
DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY (1997), 
especially chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
 2 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1980). 
 3 Richard Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276 (1974). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39 
(1976). 
 6 Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Consequences and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 281, 282 (1966). 
 7 C. Keith Boone, Privacy and Community, 9 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 1, 6 (1983). 
 8 Ernst Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in PRIVACY: NOMOS XIII 150-51 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971). 
 9 Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978). 
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of information about themselves that others might use to their 
disadvantage,”10 and as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what 
extent information about them is communicated to others.”11 
Control seems to be a common concern of many definitions, 
whether of information, territory, or the self.  Thus privacy has been 
defined as control over: “knowledge about oneself,”12 “the intimacies 
of personal identity,”13 “acquaintance with one’s personal affairs,”14 
“disclosures [of confidential information] by others when disclosures 
do not, or no longer, serve associational interests,”15 “decisions 
concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the 
agent’s love, caring, or liking,”16 and finally “control over who can 
sense us.”17 
This Article provides a historical commentary on the meaning of 
privacy, drawing from various genres, including philosophy, 
literature, and English and American jurisprudence.  Its primary 
concern is not to provide an authoritative definition of privacy, but 
rather to consider how existing literature on privacy recognizes, 
constructs, and otherwise implicates identity and the integrity of the 
self as legal and/or social values.  Integral to this concern is 
approaching privacy as a regulative principle for constructing and 
managing relations between the individual and three primary spheres 
of engagement: society, the market, and the state.18  Contemporary 
 
 10 Richard Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979). 
 11 WESTIN, supra note 1, at 7.  Westin also describes four states of individual 
privacy: Solitude, in which “the individual is separated from the group and freed from 
the observation of other persons”; Intimacy, in which “the individual is acting as a part 
of a small unit that claims and is allowed to exercise corporate seclusion so that it 
may achieve a close, relaxed, and frank relationship between two or more 
individuals”; Anonymity, which “occurs when the individual is in public places or 
performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom from identification and 
surveillance”; and Reserve, which entails “the creation of a psychological barrier 
against unwanted intrusion.”  Id. at 31. 
 12 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968); see also William A. Parent, A 
New Definition of Privacy for the Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 305, 306 (1983) (defining privacy 
as “the condition of not having undocumented personal information about oneself 
known by others”).  Parent combines the idea of privacy as a condition with a 
concern for control over information.  Id. 
 13 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977). 
 14 Hyman Gross, Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY: NOMOS XIII 169 ( J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971). 
 15 Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social 
Change 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1151 (1992). 
 16 JULIE C. INNES, PRIVACY, INTIMACY AND ISOLATION 91 (1992). 
 17 Parker, supra note 3, at 280. 
 18 By society, I mean that sphere of engagement beyond the family where 
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analyses of privacy tend to concentrate on how privacy protects the 
individual from state tyranny or the prying eyes of social busy bodies.  
Much less attention has been paid, however, to privacy as a principle 
for demarcating a space beyond the reach of market forces.  Here is 
where my concern for identity takes the fore.  As privacy recognizes 
and protects the conditions necessary for proper individuation and 
realization of the self over time, it stands in stark opposition to the 
expansive forces of the modern market, which reduces everything 
that comes within its grasp to a common medium of exchange. 
I will argue that the existing literature on privacy lays the 
groundwork for a consideration of how the law constructs and 
manages the principle of identity.  At the core of this process lies the 
concern to define and protect certain dignitary interests that some 
view as critical to maintaining the integrity of the self in the face of 
modern social, economic, and political forces.  Privacy, in short, 
provides principles for negotiating the legal management of 
personhood in a manner that facilitates the development and 
maintenance of a coherent individual identity essential to our liberal 
polity’s commitment to human flourishing. 
Among these principles are a commitment to maintaining the 
conditions necessary for proper individuation and realization of the 
self over time.  In particular, this involves the legal recognition and 
protection of a sphere of personhood beyond the reach of market 
forces.  In such a sphere, a person may choose to locate aspects of 
herself that may not be rendered fungible or commensurable with 
other objects through a market exchange.  More generally, the 
literature also reveals the potential for recognizing privacy as a means 
through which society itself is constituted.  As a principle of 
community maintenance, privacy casts the construction of the self as 
a relational, social process that implicates identities drawn from 
powerful historical and social affiliations.  In this context, privacy 
challenges the notion of the bounded self and provides legal 
principles that construct identity as contingent, open, and shifting 
across time and space.  Privacy is also ultimately grounded in a 
concern to protect the basic dignity implicated in allowing a person 
 
individuals join together and interact in a wide array of engagements of a primarily 
non-economic character.  This approximates the sphere of civil society, of 
Tocqueville-like association, and the general encounters of everyday life.  By the 
market, I refer to that sphere of interaction governed primarily by economic 
considerations, where individual activity is oriented toward providing goods and 
services that are rendered commensurable by being arrayed along a continuous 
common medium of exchange.  By the state, I refer to the formal operations of the 
institutions and apparatus of governance given sanction by the law and backed by the 
legitimized use of force. 
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to negotiate this complex terrain with a measure of autonomy and 
control over the process of developing an individuated self, capable 
of human flourishing. 
I.  PRIVACY AND THE INVIOLATE PERSONALITY 
During the nineteenth century a framework of privacy law 
developed around legal concerns ranging from protection of 
correspondence, to discussions of trespass upon the home, to 
trademark infringement and protection of the confessional.19  In his 
influential treatise on the law of torts, Judge Thomas Cooley referred 
to “the right to be left alone” as a personal immunity.20  And in 1890, 
E.L. Godkin, the prominent editor of The Nation, wrote of the 
citizen’s “right to his own reputation” as “the very first form of 
individual property,” and warned against “violations of the rights to 
privacy” as a threat to social order and civil peace.21  But it was Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis who first fully elaborated on the principle 
of privacy as a right deserving of legal recognition and protection.22 
In a now legendary law review article, Warren and Brandeis 
reviewed the diverse strands of legal, political, and social commentary 
relating to issues of privacy and wove them together into a coherent 
argument for a legally distinct right to privacy grounded in a concern 
for “man’s spiritual nature.”23  To Warren and Brandeis, privacy did 
 
 19 See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1892 (1981) [hereinafter Right to Privacy]. 
 20 THOMAS COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). 
 21 E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen. IV. To His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER’S 
MAGAZINE, July 1890, at 59-65. 
 22 For a thorough review of the right to privacy in the nineteenth century, see 
Right to Privacy, supra note 19.  The Note argues that far from creating a new right, 
Warren and Brandeis merely provided the clearest articulation of what, by 1890, was 
a tradition of “ample and explicit protection of privacy in its own right.”  Id. at 1894.  
Warren and Brandeis probably would not quarrel with this interpretation.  Indeed, 
they did their best to build their argument on what they saw as existing precedent for 
establishing a right to privacy.  As Ronald Dworkin notes of their work, it may be, 
however, that the new principle strikes out on a different line, so that it justifies a 
precedent or a series of precedents on grounds very different from what their 
opinions propose.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 119 (1977).  
Brandeis and Warren’s famous argument about the right to privacy is a dramatic 
illustration: they argued that this right was not unknown to the law, but was, on the 
contrary, demonstrated by a wide variety of decisions, in spite of the fact that the 
judges who decided these cases mentioned no such right.  Id. 
 23 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890).  Like all good legends, the article even has its own creation myths.  
William Prosser, writing seventy years later, attributed the article to Warren’s outrage 
at the press’ intrusive coverage of his daughter’s wedding.  The image of the right to 
privacy as the product of an outraged brahmin’s delicate sensibilities held sway for 
years until James Barron debunked it in 1979.  Barron showed that Warren’s 
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not involve property so much as the “more general right of the 
individual to be let alone.”24  Their goal was largely to “disentangle 
privacy from property,”25 and their great accomplishment was 
articulating privacy as a freestanding basic right.26 
Warren and Brandeis grounded the right to privacy in principles 
of human dignity and the “inviolate personality.”27  Similarly, the first 
case to recognize a right to privacy, Pavesich v. New England Life 
Insurance Co.,28 expressed concern that the use of a person’s name or 
image for a commercial purpose without his consent constituted an 
assault upon the integrity of his persona that effectively enslaved a 
part of him.  In this context, privacy rights are rooted not simply in 
dignity, but more specifically in dignity as manifested in the integrity 
of one’s individual identity or persona.  The court in Pavesich clearly 
expressed a concern that the expansive forces of the modern market 
threatened to efface individual identity.29  As Edward Bloustein noted 
in his commentary on the case: 
use of a photograph for trade purposes turns a man into a 
commodity and makes him serve the economic needs and 
interests of others.  In a community at all sensitive to the 
commercialization of human values, it is degrading to thus make 
a man a part of commerce against his will.30 
Writing seventy years after Warren and Brandeis, William Prosser 
set the standard for modern assessment of the invasion of privacy by 
 
daughter was not married around the time of the article (a cousin of his was married 
in 1890 but press reports of it were restrained and not out of the ordinary) and that 
claims that Warren was unduly sensitive to intrusions on private concerns lacked firm 
support.  See James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law 
Review 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 892-
912 (1979). 
 24 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205. 
 25 Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and 
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 648 (1991). 
 26 David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy’s Place in the Intellectual History of Tort 
Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 779-80 (1991). 
 27 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 205.  Bloustein defines the “inviolate 
personality” as “the individual’s independence, dignity, and integrity; it defines 
man’s essence as a unique and self-determining being.”  Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy 
As An Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 971 
(1964). 
 28 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). 
 29 Id. at 80. 
 30 Bloustein, supra note 27, at 988.  For more on the origins of the tort of invasion 
of privacy and its relation to emerging concerns over the newly expansive forces of 
the modern national market economy, see generally Jonathan Kahn, Enslaving the 
Image: The Origins of the Tort of Appropriation of Identity Reconsidered, 2 LEGAL THEORY 
301, 301-24 (1996). 
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fracturing the concept into four distinct torts: intrusion into private 
affairs, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light, and 
appropriation of name or likeness for commercial benefit.31  Prosser’s 
taxonomy of privacy repudiated the legacy of Warren and Brandeis by 
denying the difference between privacy and property interests and 
“by suggesting that privacy is not an independent value at all but 
rather a composite of the interests in reputation, emotional 
tranquility and intangible property.”32 
In response to Prosser, Bloustein tried to reunify the tort of 
invasion of privacy under the umbrella of injuries to human dignity.33  
Bloustein accepted Prosser’s four-part division of the tort of invasion 
of privacy, but in keeping with Warren and Brandeis, he argued that 
privacy must be recognized as an independent right, implicating not 
property but one’s very self or individuality.34  Bloustein asserted that 
the basic social value underlying all torts of invasion of privacy was a 
concern for human dignity.35  In particular, Bloustein also infused 
Prosser’s tort of appropriation of identity with a concern for the 
commodification of the individual persona.36  The tort, Bloustein 
argued, was not about the “misappropriation of something of 
pecuniary value,”37 it was about “demeaning and humiliating” the 
individual through “the commercialization of an aspect of 
personality.”38 
Hyman Gross provides a sympathetic critique of Bloustein, 
asserting that although Bloustein indicates why privacy is valuable, he 
never adequately defines it.39  Gross believes that Bloustein’s 
identification of privacy as an aspect of human dignity is apt, but 
faults his failure to specify which aspect.40  Gross defines privacy as a 
function of control over access to personal affairs,41 but he does not 
 
 31 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 32 See Bloustein, supra note 27, at 971. 
 33 Id. at 974. 
 34 Id. at 987. 
 35 Id. at 974. 
 36 Id. at 987. 
 37 Id. at 968. 
 38 Bloustein, supra note 27, at 987.  Bloustein’s work, in turn, was subject to much 
criticism; most of it was a sympathetic appreciation of his concern for dignity that 
nonetheless asserted such an interest was simply too broad and amorphous to be of 
practical use.  See, e.g., Gerety, supra note 13, at 250-53, 259; Tim Frazer, Appropriation 
of Personality-A New Tort?, 99 L. Q. REV. 281, 296 (1980); Dianne Zimmerman, Requiem 
for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’ Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 
291, 339 (1983) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight]. 
 39 Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35 (1967). 
 40 Id. at 51-52. 
 41 Id. at 35-36. 
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elaborate on the relation between privacy, dignity, and identity.  This 
must be the focus of inquiry if our concern is not so much with 
privacy per se, but with the evolving status of identity before the law.42 
While Bloustein’s focus remains on dignity and privacy, he does 
not fully consider their further relation to identity.  The harm to 
dignity caused by invasions of privacy ultimately implicates the 
integrity of individual identity.  Bloustein is clearly concerned with 
this, but he tends to assert the relation rather than explore and 
analyze it.  Dignity and identity, of course, are hardly easier to define 
than privacy.  Yet by considering the relation of dignity to privacy, we 
can develop a more complete understanding of the principles 
underlying particular rules that implicate the legal recognition and 
construction of identity. 
 
 42 Tom Gerety agrees that privacy is one single concept and thus definable.  He 
characterizes it, however, as “an autonomy, or control over the intimacies of personal 
identity.”  Gerety, supra note 13, at 236.  Gerety thus focuses on identity more 
explicitly than Bloustein, but he also criticizes Bloustein’s characterization of privacy 
as a dignitary interest as being too broad and undifferentiated.  Id. at 250-59.  Tim 
Frazer, among others, shares this criticism.  See Frazer, supra note 38, at 296. 
Like Laurence Tribe, Gerety distinguishes between public and private aspects of 
identity.  He asserts the following, 
Our personalities and our dignities are no doubt most surely and 
tightly enmeshed in the private world over which we exercise, at times, 
considerable sway.  But whether we like it or not, our selves also extend 
outside of that world into another in which most of us have very little 
power or expectation of power over the opinions and impressions 
others may form of us.  Every affront to our dignity in that outer world, 
while felt, even keenly, in our inner world, is not a legally cognizable 
assault upon our private selves. 
Gerety, supra note 13, at 259-260.  Gerety rightly raises concerns that Bloustein’s 
conception of dignitary harm may be too broad, but his distinction between pubic 
and private selves misses the point by, in effect, conflating what Alan Gewirth 
identifies as “empirical” and “inherent” dignity.  Every day each of us may suffer 
insult to empirical dignity, to our ability to conduct ourselves in a “dignified” 
manner.  Bloustein, and Warren and Brandeis before him, however, is concerned 
with deeper insults to our inherent dignity, a kind of intrinsic worth at the core of 
individual identity.  That core of identity is not simply about personal “intimacies,” it 
implicates our very sense of self and deserves protection whether in public or private.  
Thus, when Gerety goes on to assert that the tort of appropriation of identity does 
not involve privacy because it is a matter of controlling aspects of the identity that 
“face outward,” he overlooks the fact that the harm of appropriation does not only 
implicate how an individual may choose to present his or her outward identity but 
also whether to present an outward face in the first place.  Id. at 250-53. 
Gerety in effect reduces the harm of appropriation to a matter of reputation or 
simple unjust enrichment when he asserts that existing law relating to fraud and 
property rights are adequate to redress any resulting grievances.  He wholly fails to 
consider that appropriation of identity affects not only how others view you, but also 
how you view yourself: as appropriation renders a unique part of your self into a 
fungible commodity, it undermines the integrity of your persona, regardless of how 
others perceive you. 
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Whereas dignity broadly implicates a consideration of the 
inherent value of human beings, privacy involves the more focused 
right to protect the conditions necessary to individuation.  That is, 
where dignity broadly conceived is a condition of personhood, 
privacy is an attribute of individuality.  The liberal tradition connects 
the two in so far as it posits that the full realization of one’s 
personhood involves articulating and developing one’s individual 
identity.43  Assaults on identity affront dignity insofar as they deny the 
conditions of individuation necessary to the proper respect for and 
development of one’s personhood.  Invasions of privacy, therefore, 
affront dignity insofar as they undermine the integrity of one’s 
identity by: forcing the manifestation of a partial or reductive version 
of one’s individuality, more thoroughly effacing one’s individuality, 
or otherwise rendering the individual as fungible and non-distinct.  
Thus, in answer to Gross’ criticism of Bloustein, it is my assertion that 
privacy implicates that aspect of dignity grounded in the belief that a 
full realization of one’s personhood requires the recognition of, and 
respect for, the conditions necessary for each person to realize her 
distinct individual identity. 
II.  PRIVACY AS A DISTINCT INTEREST 
In searching for common privacy-based principles, this Article 
breaks from other theories, like Prosser’s, that fragment privacy into 
diverse rights.  It diverges even more radically from scholars such as 
Harry Kalven or Judith Jarvis Thomson who deny the existence of a 
distinctive tort of invasion of privacy or characterize it as “petty” at 
best.44  Thomson, for example, argues that the right to privacy never 
 
 43 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29-34 (1993); see also Reiman, supra note 
5. 
 44 Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 326-31 (1966); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 303-10 (1975).  Prosser, too, viewed privacy as essentially a 
derivative right. Prosser, supra note 31, at 389.  However, his four-part categorization 
nonetheless serves to specify, and thereby contain, specific and relatively 
autonomous privacy rights.  Others, such as Dianne Zimmerman, critique the right 
of privacy as simply irrelevant in a society where the legal protections of the First 
Amendment have extended to encompass the dissemination of almost all forms of 
information.  Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight, supra note 38, at 293-94. 
One year before Prosser’s article, Privacy, Frederick Davis argued that privacy 
was derivative of existing torts such as defamation, intrusion, and property rights.  He 
criticized privacy and harms resulting from its invasion as subjective and difficult to 
measure, and concluded that the right of privacy was “a sociological notion and not a 
jural concept at all.”  Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean By ‘Right to Privacy?’, 4 S.D. L. 
REV. 1, 19 (1959).  While correct in identifying the sociological component to 
privacy, Davis provides no convincing argument for bifurcating sociological, or other 
 2003 PRIVACY—IDENTITY MAINTENANCE 379 
stands alone but is largely derivative of a cluster of other property-
based rights to resist intrusions.45 
Thomas Scanlon and Jeffrey Reiman each offer effective 
rebuttals to Thomson by situating privacy more broadly in its social 
context.  Privacy is a distinctive and independent right that “is an 
essential part of the complex social practice by means of which the 
social group recognizes—and communicates to the individual—that 
his existence is his own.  And this is a precondition to personhood.”46  
Reiman argues that privacy is therefore “necessary to the creation of 
selves out of human beings, since a self is at least in part a human 
being who regards his existence—his thoughts, his body, his 
actions—as his own.”47  It is here that Reiman recognizes the 
significance of privacy for the constitution of the self, and for the 
recognition, construction, and maintenance of individual identity in 
and through society.  He still employs property-based metaphors of 
ownership that place him in the liberal-Lockean tradition, but he is 
also open to valuing privacy as a social dynamic.  Reiman concludes 
that Thomson’s derogation of privacy as a derivative right fails fully to 
consider the distinctiveness of the social role privacy plays and its 
special place in constituting and respecting the individual in the 
liberal state.48  Trespass and nuisance laws enforce respectful social 
interactions and protect the physical territory surrounding an 
individual, but they do not implicate the same concern for 
personhood and identity that underlie privacy. 
Scanlon also focuses on the social context by positing a common 
foundation for privacy rights “in the special interests we have in being 
able to be free from certain kinds of intrusions.”49  In his analysis, 
however, Scanlon eschews metaphors of ownership to focus on the 
transgression of normative boundaries established by social norms 
and conventions.  He asserts that a violation in the right to privacy 
occurs where there is an invasion of a “conventionally defined zone 
of privacy.”50  Scanlon’s concern for boundaries is also classically 
liberal, but his focus on the importance of social norms provides 
 
concerns from jural concerns.  He takes a classically hermetic approach to the law, 
sealing it off as an independent discipline, pure and chaste, untarnished by social or 
historical considerations.  Ironically, Prosser’s fragmentation of the tort provided 
some of the jural logic behind the concept of privacy that Davis felt was lacking. 
 45 Thomson, supra note 44, at 303-10. 
 46 Reiman, supra note 5, at 39. 
 47 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Thomas Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 315-18 (1975). 
 50 Id. 
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useful insights into the distinctive dynamics of privacy rights. 
Robert Post follows up on the work of Reiman and Scanlon, 
elaborating more fully on the social bases of privacy law.51  In his 
analysis of Warren and Brandeis’ article, Post distinguishes between 
descriptive and normative privacy.52  He understands descriptive 
privacy as an amalgam of empirically ascertainable “thoughts, 
emotions, [and] sensations” that need protection insofar as they 
comprise personality itself.53  To disturb personality is to cause mental 
pain and distress.  Post alludes to Ruth Gavison’s work in separating 
descriptive privacy into the related concepts of “secrecy,” 
“anonymity,” and “solitude.”54  Normative privacy is less a matter of 
empirical distance from intrusion than of “moral characterization” of 
certain social relations.55  It involves “forms of respect that we owe 
each other as members of a common community.”56  The 
transgression of these forms of respect violates personality.  Post 
concludes that privacy in this sense is normative “because it ultimately 
entails the articulation and application of social norms.”57  Normative 
privacy, therefore, describes why the invasion itself causes harm.  Post 
argues that the common law conception of privacy is inherently 
normative.  Nonetheless, he recognizes that diverse theories of 
privacy articulate the relation between normative and descriptive 
aspects of privacy, emphasizing the one or the other to greater or 
lesser degrees.58 
Post’s conception of normative privacy is especially useful in 
assessing how privacy-based concerns for dignity implicate the 
integrity of individual identity.  His elaboration of descriptive privacy, 
however, also clearly implicates identity interests, even if in a highly 
psychological form.  This creates a problem in analyzing the relation 
 
 51 Post, supra note 25. 
 52 Id. at 650-51. 
 53 Id. at 650. 
 54 Id. at 651. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Post, supra note 25, at 652. 
 58 Id. at 649-53.  Michael Sandel distinguishes between normative and 
“voluntarist” privacy.  He argues that Griswold’s substantive due process analysis 
enacted an essentially normative conception of privacy, whereas Eisenstadt and Roe 
marked a shift to a voluntarist notion of privacy that focuses on autonomy of 
individual choice rather than on protecting private space.  Michael Sandel, Moral 
Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 526-28 
(1989).  Sandel’s distinction between protecting space and protecting choice is 
useful but it obscures certain deeper principles underlying both approaches to 
privacy—most significantly the common dignitary concern to recognize, define, and 
protect the integrity of the individual self. 
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between law, privacy, and identity insofar as Post posits not only a 
distinction, but also a disjunction, between normative and descriptive 
privacy.  This aspect of his analysis is unnecessary and potentially 
misleading.  As Post himself observes, various conceptions and 
applications of privacy may embody both descriptive and normative 
concerns to greater or lesser degrees.59  When focusing on identity, 
therefore, it is more useful to place them along a continuum than to 
create a dichotomy between them. 
III.  PRIVACY AND DIGNITY 
Beginning at the normative end of the continuum, let us 
consider privacy as it explicitly implicates dignity, autonomy, and the 
integrity of the self.  Bloustein’s response to Prosser is a good starting 
point.  In his critique of Prosser’s fragmentation of the tort of privacy, 
Bloustein posits a common dignitary interest asserted in various 
privacy cases as a means to reintegrate the right to privacy.60  Thus, 
where Prosser found the gist of the harm in intrusion to be a species 
of intentional infliction of mental distress,61  Bloustein contends that 
the true harm was “a blow to human dignity, an assault on human 
personality.”62  Such intrusions are “wrongful because they are 
demeaning of individuality, and they are such whether or not they 
cause emotional trauma.”63  Extending this analysis to governmental 
intrusion, Bloustein sees intrusion as “the primary weapon of the 
tyrant.”64 
Similarly, Bloustein distinguishes invasions of privacy involving 
public disclosure from defamation, asserting that “defamation is 
founded on loss of reputation while invasion of privacy is founded on 
an insult to individuality.”65  Moreover, the tort of appropriation of 
identity did not involve a proprietary interest, but rather caused harm 
by “demeaning and humiliating” the individual through the 
“commercialization of an aspect of personality.”66  Thus, Bloustein 
recapitulates the original effort of Warren and Brandeis to articulate 
a unitary interest in protecting the intangible spiritual nature of man. 
In his essay Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, Louis 
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Henkin argues that “human dignity requires respect for every 
individual’s physical and psychic integrity, for his (her) ‘personhood’ 
before the law, [and] for her (his) autonomy and freedom.”67  
Henkin’s identification of integrity and personhood as central to 
dignity resonates with the core principles underlying the normative 
conception of privacy articulated by Bloustein.  Privacy is valued 
insofar as it fosters the conditions within which an individual may 
establish, maintain and develop her identity as a core aspect of 
personhood.  Thus conceived, invasions of privacy constitute an 
affront to human dignity by undermining one’s identity.  If our 
primary concern is with such affronts, then acts that are individually 
experienced and also socially and historically understood as threats to 
the integrity of one’s identity begin to define the “boundaries” of 
privacy. 
Alan Gewirth sets out two concepts of dignity as the basis of 
human rights: empirical and inherent.68  Dignity in the empirical 
sense “is a characteristic that is often also signified by its 
corresponding adjective, dignified; it is variously, a kind of gravity or 
decorum or composure or self-respect or self-confidence together 
with various good qualities that may justify such attitudes.”69  He 
argues that empirical dignity may be gained or lost.  It is contingent 
and hence a consequence of having rights, but it is not “the ground of 
rights.”70  Inherent dignity, in contrast, “signifies a kind of intrinsic 
worth that belongs equally to all human beings as such . . . .”71  It is 
non-fungible and inalienable; thus “[h]aving [inherent] dignity is the 
equivalent of having rights.”72 
To a degree, Gewirth’s distinction between empirical and 
inherent dignity echoes Post’s distinction between descriptive and 
normative privacy.  Normative privacy may be conceived as an arena 
in which inherent dignity is defined, articulated, and maintained.  
Each involves assessing (and enforcing) historical and social 
constructions of particular values about the worth of the individual 
and the proper boundaries of behavior (both individual and 
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governmental) in a civilized community or a decent state. 
Ironically, the very idea of normative “boundaries” may call forth 
a more empirical or descriptive conception of privacy, especially as 
the metaphor becomes more spatial.  Gewirth, of course, is not 
literally talking about spatial boundaries, but his characterization of 
dignity as non-fungible and inalienable places it beyond the reach of 
market forces.  There is an implicit spatial relationship here that 
echoes Warren and Brandeis’ concerns to keep certain personal 
matters out of the public eye.73  Dignity demands the maintenance of 
a space outside of, and perhaps existing in opposition to, the world of 
the market.  Warren and Brandeis defined that space in terms of 
privacy—it is the arena where the non-fungible aspects of the human 
spirit are protected from a debasing commodification.74  In this 
respect, according to the Warren and Brandeis model, empirical and 
inherent dignities intertwine.  For these late nineteenth century 
genteel professionals, privacy enabled one to behave empirically in a 
“dignified” manner; but such behavior was conceived primarily as an 
outward manifestation of one’s inherent dignity. 
William Parent elaborates on the type of intrinsic worth that 
Gewirth finds at the core of human dignity.75  Parent’s term, “moral 
dignity,” is characterized as “the right not to be arbitrarily and 
therefore unjustly disparaged as a person.”76  Parent thus 
characterizes dignity relationally as a function of how we are treated 
by others.  Ironically, however, he does not seem to appreciate how 
personhood and identity themselves may be constructed relationally 
through social and historical interaction.  Rather, he assumes an 
autonomous individual who has certain rights respecting her dignity.  
Moreover, his concept of dignity is ultimately negative, involving a 
right not to be treated a certain way.  There is no sense of dignity as 
involving a positive right to flourish as a person.  The right to privacy, 
in contrast, was valued by Warren and Brandeis not simply because it 
allowed the cultured individual to keep out the debasing influences 
of a crass modernity, but also because it helped to sustain a space and 
a community within which one could realize his full potential as a 
civilized individual.77  Just as one may conceive the right to privacy as 
more than the negative right simply “to be left alone,” so too may one 
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conceive dignity as more than the negative right not to be 
mistreated.78 
IV.  PRIVACY AS AUTONOMY 
Justice William Brennan has argued that “the Constitution 
embodies the aspiration to social justice, brotherhood and human 
dignity that brought this nation into being.”79  Ronald Dworkin 
echoes Justice Brennan in identifying a belief in individual human 
dignity as “cardinal” in our political culture and in the structure of 
the Constitution.80  He characterizes this as a belief “that people have 
the moral right—and the moral responsibility—to confront for 
themselves, answering to their own consciences and convictions, the 
most fundamental questions touching the meaning and value of their 
own lives.”81  Among these rights is “procreative autonomy” which, 
Dworkin notes, has its most available justification in the “privacy” 
cases.82  He thus connects privacy to the notion of autonomy and 
places both in the context of the broader value of human dignity. 
Privacy as autonomy is often conflated with issues of control.  
Ferdinand Schoeman characterizes privacy in the context of social 
relations as protection “from social overreaching [that] limits the 
control of others over our lives.”83  Similarly, Avishai Margalit argues 
that governmental invasions of privacy humiliate individuals by 
depriving them of control over their lives, or by debasing the value of 
such control.84  Julie Innes, in contrast, has a fairly de-politicized 
conception of privacy as “the state of an agent possessing control over 
a realm of intimacy, which includes her decisions about intimate 
informational access, intimate access, and intimate actions.”85  Innes 
goes on to define intimacy as involving choices that draw their 
“meaning and value from the agent’s love, liking, and care.”86  Privacy 
claims, therefore, are claims to possess “autonomy with respect to our 
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expression of love, liking, and care.”87  Innes reduces the value of 
privacy to an acknowledgment of respect for persons “as human 
beings . . . with the potential to freely develop close relationships.”88  
This sounds appealing, but it is a fairly impoverished conception of 
privacy.  Innes’s definition gives us no reason for such valuations, nor 
does it explain why relations of “intimacy” are more important than 
respect for each other as citizens, or simply as human beings.  Innes’s 
approach, ironically, threatens to efface individuality by valuing the 
individual only insofar as she is capable of intimate relations.  This 
amounts to a sort of psychological reductionism that completely fails 
to account for the sort of humiliation identified by Margalit, which 
can threaten to undermine the integrity of individual identity and 
personhood. 
Laurence Tribe, on the other hand, casts autonomy broadly as 
fully implicating a variety of “rights of privacy and personhood.”89  
Focusing on the issue of control, he distinguishes privacy from 
autonomy in his analysis of Roe v. Wade.  The key issue in Roe, he 
asserts, is not privacy but autonomy, which he defines in terms of 
control over one’s body and reproductive destiny.90  Similarly, Henkin 
argues that Supreme Court cases from Griswold to Roe were not really 
about privacy, but about recognizing a new “zone of autonomy, of 
presumptive immunity to governmental regulation.”91  Such 
distinctions make sense under limited construction, but they depend 
on a rather cramped conception that replicates privacy as a function 
of distinct social spheres: private and public (or perhaps, private and 
not private).  This distinction seems reasonable, but it shades into a 
descriptive, rather than normative, notion of privacy.  It looks first to 
where invasions occur rather than to what values such invasions 
threaten.  If we focus instead on normative privacy as an affirmative 
right to maintain the integrity of one’s personhood and identity, the 
distinction between autonomy and privacy becomes less significant.92 
Drucilla Cornell takes just such an affirmative approach to 
privacy rights when she uses psychoanalytic theory to connect the 
right to abortion with the concept of bodily integrity.93  She argues 
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that “the wrong in denying a right to abortion is not a wrong to the 
‘self,’ but a wrong that prevents the development of the minimum 
conditions of individuation necessary for any meaningful concept of 
selfhood.”94  Yet because the conditions of individuation are “social 
and symbolic,” Cornell hesitates to characterize the right to bodily 
integrity as the right to privacy “if that right is understood as a right 
to be left alone.”95  There is, however, no need to bifurcate the right 
to bodily integrity from the right to privacy if, as Post and other 
scholars suggest, we conceive privacy itself as social and symbolic—a 
means of constructing community and the individual, not simply of 
sheltering oneself from intrusion.96  Thus understood, the right to 
privacy implicates a concern for maintaining the conditions necessary 
to sustain normatively valued individuation through which the 
integrity of one’s personhood and identity is established and 
developed. 
V.  PRIVACY AND CONTROL OVER INFORMATION 
Moving toward the descriptive end of the continuum, one may 
view privacy more specifically as a matter of control over certain types 
of information.  Such control implicates ideals of autonomy but tends 
to focus on a more empirical evaluation of the type of information at 
issue and the circle or number of people to whom it is exposed.  
Thus, for example, we have Tom Gerety’s definition of privacy as “an 
autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity,”97 or 
Tribe’s discussion of informational autonomy as the right to select to 
whom and for what purposes we divulge information about 
ourselves.98  Richard Parker provides a more purely informational 
definition of privacy when he asserts that “privacy is control over 
when and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by others.”99  
Similarly, Ruth Gavison argues that invasions of privacy can be 
measured in terms of “the extent to which we are known to others.”100 
Alan Westin asserts that “privacy is the claim of individuals, 
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groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others.”101  
Westin therefore casts privacy as a type of withdrawal from society.102  
Following Westin, Randall Bezanson characterizes privacy as “a 
matter of individual control”103 over “identified types of personal 
information”104 and seeks thereby to “embed [privacy] in the idea of 
confidentiality.”105 
Westin and Bezanson’s analyses of privacy are useful for 
developing a scheme to regulate attempts by the government or news 
media to gain specific types of information about particular 
individuals, but they are otherwise quite limited in their conception 
of the nature and value of privacy.  In particular, they have little to say 
about how or why invasions of privacy may implicate dignitary 
interests or affect the integrity of one’s personhood or identity.  Nor 
do they fully consider how the harm caused by loss of informational 
control may implicate these values.  In his cogent analysis of Warren 
and Brandeis’ original elaboration of the right to privacy, Bezanson 
recognizes that they were trying to protect “the individual’s right to 
enjoy an identity forged by the existing social institutions of family 
and community.”106  He then advocates a contemporary version of the 
tort based on confidentiality, which raises new questions, such as who 
determines what appropriately private information is and according 
to what criteria.  He mistakenly reduces Warren and Brandeis’ 
original articulation of a dignitary conception of privacy as “an 
attempt to protect the functioning of those discrete social institutions 
from the monolithic, impersonal and value-free forces of modern 
society . . . .”107  Warren and Brandeis clearly were trying to impose 
certain social norms of genteel bourgeois society, but they opposed 
the forces of modernity not because they were “value-free,” but 
precisely because of the particular values modernity embodied and 
enforced.108 
Bezanson understandably rejects aspects of Warren and 
Brandeis’ culturally chauvinistic view of privacy as unworkable and 
undesirable in today’s more individualistic, pluralistic, and 
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democratic society. But characterizing modern society as diverse, 
pluralistic, and “value-free” allows Bezanson to finesse the problem of 
privacy as a normative value by situating confidentiality as a matter of 
individual control independent of “external and social norms.”109  
The problem is that individual control cannot be divorced from 
social norms without a complete fragmentation of society.  Legal 
recognition of privacy interests itself implies and depends upon the 
imposition of socially determined limits to privacy.  Moreover, 
modern society certainly is not value-free, nor does respect for 
pluralism and diversity absolve us of a need to employ values to 
understand, define, and ultimately enforce a right to privacy.110 
Warren and Brandeis understood this.  They were certainly 
elitists and their dignitary ideals might have served hegemonically to 
enforce certain repressive community norms, but simply identifying 
such shortcomings does not solve the problem.  The challenge, 
rather, is to engage Warren and Brandeis in a discourse to elaborate 
an evolving understanding of the relation between privacy and 
dignity in order to promote legal practices that more fully recognize 
and respect the integrity of individual personhood and identity. 
VI.  PRIVATE SPACE AND SEPARATE SPHERES 
Finally, privacy is perhaps most concretely conceived as a matter 
of regulating personal space or boundaries.  Privacy is often defined 
spatially as involving a realm placed beyond the reach or measure of 
certain social forces.111  From this conception arises the notion of a 
private “sphere” as a bounded area separate and apart from both the 
world of politics and the market.  The notion of “separate spheres,” 
evokes feminist critiques of the historical construction of the private 
sphere as an arena of patriarchal dominance over women.112  The 
public/private distinction arguably lies at the core of liberal political 
and legal thought, but as Carole Pateman notes, “liberalism is 
inherently ambiguous about the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ . . . .”113  
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Perhaps some of the ambiguity lies in the notion of privacy itself.  As 
Anita Allen and Erin Mack observe, “‘privacy’ denotes conditions of 
physical or informational inaccessibility, such as solitude or secrecy.  
But it can also designate ‘the private sphere’ and a degree of 
autonomy within it.”114  Frances Olsen makes an additional and 
important distinction within the private sphere between the market 
and the family.  She argues that similar conceptions of the private 
sphere are used to characterize and assess the proper degree and 
type of state intervention in the marketplace and at home.115 
Feminist critiques of privacy tend to focus primarily on power 
relations within the domestic sphere of family life.  Originating in the 
changing society of early nineteenth century America, the ideology of 
separate spheres posited a dichotomy between the sacred space of the 
home and the profane world of the market and political life.116  As the 
workplace became separated from the home, the world of commerce 
and industry attained a masculine connotation while domestic life 
became the special province of women.117  Olsen points out the dual 
nature of the family/market dichotomy, arguing that while it “tended 
to mask the inferior, degraded position of women, it also provided a 
degree of autonomy and a base from which women could and did 
evaluate their status.”118  The problem becomes acute, however, when 
the ideology of separate spheres is invoked in legal and political 
systems to justify state action that effectively ratifies or consolidates 
the family as a feudal patriarchal structure.  In so far as an ideology of 
privacy is used to perpetuate a status quo of hierarchy and 
paternalistic dominance of women and children within the domestic 
sphere, feminist analysis designates the private sphere an instrument 
of injustice.119  For example, in her critique of the logic of Roe v. Wade, 
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Catherine MacKinnon characterizes the idea of the “private” as an 
instrument of women’s subordination, arguing that “when the law of 
privacy restricts intrusions into intimacy, it bars change in control 
over that intimacy.  The existing distribution of power and resources 
within the private sphere will be precisely what the law of privacy 
exists to protect.”120 
Nonetheless, Pateman notes that while feminist critiques argue 
that public and private spheres “are actually interrelated, connected 
by a patriarchal structure,” she also notes that “they do not necessarily 
suggest that no distinction can or should be drawn between the 
personal and political aspects of social life.”121  Similarly, Susan Moller 
Okin notes that “challenging the dichotomy [between public and 
private] does not necessarily mean denying the usefulness of a 
concept of privacy or the value of privacy itself in human life.”122  
Indeed, the concept of privacy has proven particularly useful when 
invoked to place the domestic sphere outside of or beyond the 
control of market forces.123  Thus, Warren and Brandeis placed the 
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“inviolate personality” in such a sphere when they disentangled 
privacy from property rights and argued that it was not a material 
value and hence should not be subject to market forces.124  The dual 
nature of privacy is evidenced by the fact that while Warren and 
Brandeis may have disentangled privacy rights from property rights, 
their conception of the value of human dignity remained mired in a 
separate spheres ideology.  Their focus on protecting the “sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life”125 valorized the bourgeois 
patriarchal family as the source and guardian of spiritual values.  As 
Allen and Mack note, “the Warren and Brandeis article initiated a 
doctrinal revolution in tort law.  But the article was business as usual 
when it came to gender.”126  Nonetheless, the fact that their 
conception of human dignity reflected the patriarchal norms of their 
social class and historical era does not necessarily undermine the 
validity of the principle that under the common law of privacy the 
power of the state may be (and has been) invoked to protect human 
dignity from debasing commodification by market forces. 
The problem was not so much in Warren and Brandeis’ basic 
conception of privacy as a bulwark against the market as it was their 
highly gendered notion of the nature of privacy and human dignity.  
Thus, while engaging in a feminist critique of privacy, we must be 
careful not to throw out its useful elements.  It is necessary, rather, to 
read principles of privacy in light of our contemporary 
understandings of gender and power in modern society.  Although 
many feminist critiques focus on how privacy has been invoked for 
legitimate state action that maintains domestic patriarchy or keeps 
women out of the world of industry, commerce, and politics, more 
attention needs to be paid to the ways in which privacy has been used 
to initiate state action that protects individuals, not only from the 
state, but from the market.127 
 
hierarchy,” but she does not fully consider the possible harms arising from the 
relentless logic of the market which commodifies all things that come within its 
ambit.  Olsen, supra note 115, at 1528. 
 124 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 23, at 201-05. 
 125 Id. at 195. 
 126 Allen & Mack, supra note 111, at 477. 
 127 Ruth Gavison offers a cogent analysis of many feminist critiques of privacy.  See 
Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43 
(1992).  While embracing the move to question the public/private distinction, she 
criticizes what she sees as the tendency to fight “the verbal distinctions between 
public and private, rather than fighting invalid arguments which invoke them, or the 
power structures which manipulate them in unjustifiable ways.”  Id.  Gavison resists 
radical dichotomies between public and private, arguing, in effect, for a continuum 
along which entities may be placed: “Although most entities are neither clearly 
public nor clearly private, important normative conclusions may still follow from the 
 392 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:371 
VII.  PRIVATE SPACE AS PERSONAL ZONES 
Spatial conceptions of privacy not only involve constructions of a 
private “sphere” within society, but also involve establishing more 
personal “zones” of privacy around the individual.  Thus, Arnold 
Simmel argues that “every assertion of our right to personal privacy is 
an assertion that anyone crossing a particular privacy boundary is 
transgressing against some portion of our self.  Privacy boundaries, 
accordingly, are self-boundaries.”128  Charles Fried also remarks upon 
the “spatial” aspect of privacy as a context that fosters “relations of the 
most fundamental sort.”129  Fried, like Simmel, therefore characterizes 
invasions of privacy as threats to “our very integrity as persons.”130  
Similarly, Edward Shils describes one aspect of privacy as “the 
existence of a boundary through which information does not flow 
from the person who possesses it to others.”131  He argues that 
“intrusions of privacy are baneful because they interfere with an 
individual in his disposition of what belongs to him.  The ‘social 
space’ around an individual, the recollection of his past, his 
conversation, his body and its image, all belong to him.”132  Echoing 
Warren and Brandeis’ concern for man’s spirit, Shils argued that a 
person “possesses” these things “by virtue of the charisma which is 
inherent in his existence as an individual soul . . . and which is 
inherent in his membership in the civil community.”133  Invasions of 
privacy, therefore, threaten the very integrity of the self—and the 
community. 
Again, however, we see a mingling of descriptive and normative 
aspects of privacy.  Thus, Thomas Scanlon notes that “zones” of 
privacy are not necessarily spatial but are defined and bounded by 
social convention and norms.134  For Simmel, Fried, and Shils, 
invasions of privacy involve transgressing both empirical and 
normative boundaries.  Each invokes empirical spatial concepts to 
define privacy, yet argues that invasions of privacy threaten the 
“integrity” of the self.  The threat involves far more than causing 
mere mental distress; it entails the transgression of norms of social 
respect due to individuals simply by reason of their membership in a 
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community—hence it also threatens community.  Their analyses 
therefore implicate an understanding of identity maintenance (and, 
ultimately, community maintenance) as a core concept of privacy. 
Robert Post offers a more explicitly normative conception of 
private space, asserting that “in the common law, as in everyday life, 
issues of privacy refer to the characterization of human action, not to 
the neutral and objective measurement of the world.”135  For Post, 
privacy involves basic rules of civility through which a community 
constitutes itself.136  Invasions of privacy “threaten to exclude” a 
person from the community by denying the protection of rules of 
civility.137  Under such circumstances, a court verdict can serve to 
vindicate the plaintiff and reestablish her as a full member of the 
community.138 
Post draws upon Erving Goffman’s notions of “territories of the 
self” to elaborate a spatial conception of privacy as normative and 
socially constructed. Such territories are contextual; their boundaries 
are socially determined and vary according to a wide variety of 
factors.  Post notes that “Goffman defines a territory as a ‘field of 
things’ or a ‘preserve’ to which an individual can claim ‘entitlement 
to possess, control, use, or dispose of.’”139 
Like Shils, Post invokes metaphors of possession and ownership 
in approaching privacy.  The valorization of possession, however, 
represents the problem of possessive individualism, whereby the self 
is defined primarily by the things it possesses.140  Such a conception 
may efface any notion of a core self that exists in any meaningful way 
antecedent to the act of possessing.  Thus, for example, just as 
Anthony Cohen criticizes Goffman’s conception of the performative 
self as reducing selfhood to the “skill and imperatives of 
performance,”141 so too does the conception of territories of the self 
run the risk of reducing selfhood to “possessed” territory. 
More specifically, Post construes the tort of intrusion to lend 
 
 135 Post, supra note 96, at 969. 
 136 Id. at 970. 
 137 Id. at 968. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 971 (citing Erving Goffman, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN 
PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 28 (1971)). 
 140 For an insightful discussion of this problem in the context of cultural property, 
see Richard Handler, Who Owns the Past?  History, Cultural Property, and the Logic of 
Possessive Individualism, in THE POLITICS OF CULTURE 64 (Brett Williams ed., 1991) 
(discussing C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 
(1962)). 
 141 ANTHONY P. COHEN, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ALTERNATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
IDENTITY 68 (1994). 
 394 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:371 
“authoritative sanction to the territories of the self.”142  Conceived of 
in these terms, the tort of intrusion serves three purposes: 
First, it safeguards the respect due individuals by virtue of their 
territorial claims.  Second, it maintains the language or “ritual 
idiom” constituted by territories, thus conserving the particular 
meanings carried by that language.  Third, the tort preserves the 
ability of individuals to speak through the idiom of territories . . . 
.143 
Post invokes Jeffrey Reiman to echo his conclusion that control over 
such territories is central to maintaining a sense of oneself as “as an 
independent or autonomous person.”144 
For Post, privacy helps to constitute both the community and the 
individual.  The distinctive character of each, its “identity,” is 
sustained through the maintenance of rules of civility.  Similarly, C. 
Keith Boone also seeks to challenge the notion of privacy as a 
function of opposition between individual and community when he 
asserts that “like inhalation and exhalation, vital to the functioning of 
a larger organism, privacy and community should be understood as 
contrary and cooperative at the same time.”145  While deeply 
insightful, Post’s analysis  does not fully consider the nature of 
identity itself much beyond a person’s sense of herself as 
independent.  His attention to the social construction of privacy 
nicely contextualizes the issue but, like Boone, he still employs a 
conception of the liberal individual as bounded and separate. 
Recent critical legal scholarship, particularly in the area of 
feminist theory, offers a more radical challenge to the very notion of 
a bounded self as the relevant focus of rights.  Jennifer Nedelsky, for 
example, argues that “[w]e need a new conception of the tension 
between the collective and the individual, for which boundary is not 
an apt metaphor.”146  She notes that the Constitution’s focus on 
property has fostered the development of boundary metaphors in 
rights analysis.  Yet she also argues that the boundary of the self is not 
self-evident.  Individual autonomy is not a static characteristic but is 
relational.147  Insofar as the individual is defined with reference to the 
collective, boundaries become problematic.  “What is essential to the 
development of autonomy,” Nedelsky concludes, “is not protection 
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against intrusion but constructive relationship.  The central question 
for inquiries into autonomy (legal or otherwise) is then how to 
structure relationships so that they foster rather than undermine 
autonomy.”148  To the extent that boundary metaphors obscure the 
relational aspect of autonomy, they mask critical power relations.149  
Jane Mansbridge notes that political conceptions of connectedness 
are “coded” as female while separateness is “coded” as male.150  She 
also argues that reconceiving autonomy as requiring a nurturing web 
of relations undermines the either/or character of the opposition 
between individual and community.151 
Nedelsky and Mansbridge add a gender dimension to Michael 
Sandel’s critique of John Rawls’ “original position” for presupposing 
a picture of the person as an “unencumbered self.”152  Sandel notes 
that what is most important for the personhood of the 
unencumbered self “are not the ends we choose, but our capacity to 
choose them.”153  Sandel argues that such a view denies “the 
possibility of membership in any community bound by moral ties 
antecedent to choice . . . .”154  For Sandel, individual identity is largely 
constituted through membership in community: we do not realize 
our personhood simply through the choices we make but through 
our associations and our place in history and society.155 
This relational understanding of autonomy echoes Post and 
Boone’s conceptions of privacy as constituting and being constituted 
by community.  Privacy, thus, may be conceived as a principle that 
recognizes and protects the relations necessary to develop autonomy.  
More than this, however, privacy involves protecting relations 
through which one develops a sense of oneself as unique, that is, a 
sense of identity.  Nor is a concern for uniqueness antithetical to a 
focus on the relational aspect of identity.  Rather, each individual 
may develop a distinctive set of relations within and through which 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 See also Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts, Possibilities, 
in LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM? 219-252 (Allan C. Hutchinson 
& Leslie J.M. Green eds., 1989). 
 150 Jane Mansbridge, Feminism and Democratic Community, in DEMOCRATIC 
COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV 351 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993). 
 151 Id. 
 152 Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, in 
COMMUNITARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM 18 (Shlomo Avinieri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 
1992). 
 153 Id. at 19. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 18-24.  See generally MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF 
JUSTICE (1982). 
 396 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:371 
he or she negotiates a unique identity. 
VIII.  PRIVACY AND THE INTERESTS OF IDENTITY UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Because discussions and applications of privacy in the legal 
context often cross the boundary between common law and 
constitutional principles, it is necessary to consider briefly the current 
status of constitutional privacy.  This, of course, remains one of the 
most controversial areas of modern constitutional law.  This is not 
intended to review comprehensively the controversies surrounding 
privacy, but merely to highlight some of the key themes enunciated 
in major privacy cases arising under the Constitution, particularly as 
they relate to the recognition of legal interests in identity.  In his 
discussion of the social foundations of the law of defamation, Robert 
Post notes that since 1964 the law of defamation has “been largely 
responsive to constitutional decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court,” which “has used the First Amendment as a tool to ‘reshape 
the common law landscape.’”156  The same may be said for much of 
the jurisprudence of privacy.  Just as New York Times v. Sullivan157 
radically changed common law defamation, so too have 
constitutional doctrines come to dominate discussions of privacy 
since Griswold v. Connecticut.158  For Bloustein, this connection is 
natural, because he sees the principles of dignity as central to both 
constitutional and common law privacy.159 
Judith Wagner DeCew argues that similar interests are at stake in 
both constitutional and common law privacy.160  Justice Brandeis 
himself provided perhaps the most direct link between them in his 
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.161  In this case the Taft 
Court’s majority opinion found inter alia that a state wiretap did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable 
search and seizure.162  In an impassioned and somewhat indignant 
dissent, Brandeis argued first that “clauses guaranteeing to the 
individual protection against specific abuses of power, must have a 
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similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.”163  This echoes 
almost exactly the tone and substance of Warren and Brandeis’ 
article on the common law right to privacy, published some thirty-
seven years earlier.164  As discussed below, Warren and Brandeis based 
their articulation of the right to privacy on the belief that the 
common law “grows to meet the new demands of society.”165  
According to Brandeis, both constitutional and common law privacy 
owe their emergence to the adaptation of old legal principles to new 
circumstances.166 
More specifically, in his Olmstead dissent, Justice Brandeis 
expressed concern that “subtler and more far-reaching means of 
invading privacy have become available to the [g]overnment . . . by 
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain 
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.”167  The 
“progress of science,” he concluded, had furnished government with 
an ever growing power to intrude into the private life of citizens.168  A 
similar concern for the intrusive power of new technologies pervades 
Warren and Brandeis’ article on the common law of privacy—only 
there the focus is on private parties, such as the media, using 
technology to expose private affairs to the gaze of the urban masses 
and the debasing materialism of the market.169  Finally, whereas 
Warren and Brandeis spoke of the common law right to privacy as 
protecting “man’s spiritual nature” and “inviolate personality,”170 in 
Olmstead Brandeis quoted almost verbatim from his earlier article 
when he asserted that constitutional privacy was based on the 
Founders’ recognition of “the significance of man’s spiritual nature, 
of his feelings and of his intellect.”171  He concluded that “the right to 
be left alone [was] the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men.”172  Brandeis saw both common law and 
constitutional privacy, therefore, as central to a civilized community.  
Both drew on the sorts of dignitary concerns identified by Bloustein, 
the former focusing on private actors, and the latter on the state. 
In his discussion of the place of privacy in a decent society, 
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Avishai Margalit suggests some distinctions between institutional and 
social encroachments on privacy that may be useful in considering 
the relationship between constitutional and common law privacy.173  
Margalit first distinguishes between a decent society and a civilized 
one: 
A civilized society is one whose members do not humiliate one 
another, while a decent society is one in which the institutions do 
not humiliate people.  Thus, for example, one might think of 
Communist Czechoslovakia as a nondecent but civilized society, 
while it is possible to imagine without any contradiction a Czech 
Republic which would be more decent but less civilized.174 
Margalit asserts that a decent society requires that institutions not 
encroach on personal privacy.175  He sees the malicious 
encroachments of gossip, which are of such great concern to Warren 
and Brandeis, as “more relevant to the question of whether a society 
is civilized than whether it is decent.”176  In each case his primary 
concern is for the dignity of the individual or, rather, that the 
individual not be humiliated.177  Margalit’s distinctions here nicely 
echo the respective concerns of common law and constitutional 
privacy in the United States.  Constitutional privacy focuses primarily 
on state institutions; common law privacy focuses primarily on 
individual social actors.  Margalit notes that both types of 
encroachments on privacy share the power to humiliate.178  Similarly, 
constitutional and common law privacy ultimately share a concern to 
protect the dignity of the individual generally, and the integrity of 
her identity in particular.  We see this connection most clearly in the 
relation between Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy and his dissent in 
Olmstead.179 
It is in its concern for the integrity of the individual’s identity 
that the jurisprudence of constitutional privacy is most relevant to 
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this discussion.  Both common law and constitutional privacy 
recognize and manage identity.  Indeed, it is from common law 
privacy that much of constitutional jurisprudence derives its 
approach to assessing the legal status of identity in relation to dignity 
and individual integrity.  Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead makes 
this clear.  More recently, a similar linking of common law and 
constitutional principles of privacy is evident in Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence in Rosenblatt v. Baer, where he asserted the following: 
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from 
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our 
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human 
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty.  The protection of private personality, like the protection 
of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.  But this does not mean that the 
right is entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of 
our constitutional system.180 
Justice Stewart effectively used the common law tradition of privacy 
and its concerns for the dignity and integrity of the individual to 
inform his constitutional reading of the fundamental principles of 
constitutional jurisprudence.  Our common law tradition of privacy 
implicitly informs the Justice’s conception of principles that lie at the 
“root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”181 
Laurence Tribe articulates similar considerations to connect two 
basic aspects of constitutional privacy.  Tribe distinguishes between 
“inward-looking” privacy, which demands secrecy, sanctuary, or 
seclusion from “outward looking” privacy that relates more to 
controlling how one is perceived by others in society.  Both privacy 
interests, however, are joined by their common recognition of the 
need “to be master of the identity one creates in the world.”182 
Thus, when Justice Brandeis construes the wiretaps in Olmstead 
as menacing the “spiritual nature” of man, he is articulating a 
concern for more than the mere protection of secrets.  He argues 
that the Constitution should be invoked to protect a sphere in which 
the individual can freely maintain and develop his identity.  Some of 
the early substantive due process cases from the same era articulate 
similar concerns for maintaining the integrity of institutions and 
practices, such as the family and child-rearing, that were then 
perceived as central to maintaining the integrity of individual 
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identity.  For example, in Meyer v. Nebraska,183 the Court struck down a 
state law that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to 
schoolchildren.  Decided in the aftermath of the virulent anti-
German sentiment engendered by the First World War, the Court 
found that the state had gone too far in trying “to foster a 
homogeneous people.”184 
Similarly, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,185 the Court struck down a 
statute requiring children to attend only public schools; that is, the 
law prohibited them from attending private or parochial schools.  
Citing Meyer, the Court focused on the right of the parents to “direct 
the upbringing and education of children under their control” and 
declared that “[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the 
State to standardize its children . . . .”186  The Court concluded that 
“[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture 
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”187  While 
certainly evoking images of the family as the private province (and 
property) of the male patriarch, the Court’s language also resonates 
with Margalit’s construction of the role of privacy in maintaining a 
decent society.  These cases do not forbid all intrusions by the state 
into the life of the family, but they do forbid acts that are perceived to 
threaten the integrity of the family and its children.  The threats here 
involved “homogenization” or “standardization;” that is, acts which 
effaced the individual identity of family members.188 
More recently, the Court expressed a similar concern for the 
integrity of the family in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.189  In Moore, the 
Court struck down a local housing ordinance that limited occupancy 
of dwelling units to members of a single family.  The ordinance 
defined “family” in terms of a few categories of individuals related by 
blood.190  The lower court had found that Moore violated the 
ordinance because she lived with her two grandchildren who were 
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cousins.191  In his opinion for a four justice plurality, Justice Powell 
asserted that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and 
family life” was protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.192  Citing a long list of cases beginning with 
Meyer and Pierce, Powell declared that the Court “ha[s] consistently 
acknowledged a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter.’”193  After expounding on the “sanctity of the family” as a 
source and transmitter of “cherished values,”194 Powell echoed Pierce, 
in his conclusion that “the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from 
standardizing its children and its adults by forcing all to live in certain 
narrowly defined family patterns.”195 
The intrusion of the state into the construction of the family 
unit implicates precisely the type of institutional humiliation that 
concerned Margalit.  Margalit aptly noted that one of the central 
motifs of the humiliation caused by institutional violation of privacy is 
“rejection, that is, exclusion from the ‘Family of Man.’”196  The Court 
in Moore gave this figurative construction of the human family a literal 
application.  The state’s refusal to recognize or respect the integrity 
of the plaintiff’s familial unit humiliated her as an individual and 
effaced (standardized) her individuality. 
Privacy principles also inform constitutional law in other forms 
of association.197  Bloustein in particular proposes an explicit link 
between individual privacy and the right of association.  “The right to 
be let alone,” he asserts, “protects the integrity and dignity of the 
individual.  The right to associate with others in confidence—the 
right of privacy in one’s associations—assures the success and 
integrity of the group purpose.”198  Perhaps the case most clearly 
embodying Bloustein’s concerns is NAACP v. Alabama.199  In this case, 
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the Supreme Court barred the state of Alabama from requiring the 
local NAACP chapter to disclose its membership lists, asserting that 
the Court “has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to 
associate and privacy in one’s associations.”200  The Court then stated 
that “[i]nviolability of privacy in group association may in many 
circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of 
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”201  
Beyond the explicit references to privacy, the Court’s focus on 
“dissident beliefs” also evidences a concern to resist the sort of 
standardization that it decried in Meyer, Pierce, and Moore.202  Whereas 
personal and familial privacy protect the conditions necessary for 
people to realize their individual identities, the political context of 
NAACP v. Alabama indicates that respect for one’s associations 
protects the conditions necessary for a decent society to realize its 
identity as a democracy. 
Perhaps the Supreme Court’s most forceful articulation of the 
privacy-based identity interests implicated by the right of association 
is found in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.203  In this case, the Court 
found that the application of a state law to compel the Jaycees to 
accept women as regular members did not violate their First 
Amendment right of association.204  Justice Brennan found that the 
basis of associational rights lay in a group’s relation to sustaining and 
developing the identity of individual members: 
Without precisely identifying every consideration that may 
underlie this type of constitutional protection, we have noted that 
certain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the 
culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and 
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity 
and act as critical buffers between the individual and the power of 
the State . . . .  Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such 
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of 
their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.  
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state 
interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to 
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define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.205 
Here Justice Brennan invoked the First Amendment to protect the 
social processes and relations through which individuals form and 
sustain their identities.  His concern to maintain a buffer between the 
individual and the state echoes Margalit’s concerns regarding the 
role of privacy in a decent society.206  Justice Brennan, indeed, 
asserted a type of associational privacy along the lines Bloustein had 
earlier articulated.  Again, as with common law privacy, the basic goal 
is to legally recognize, define, and protect the integrity of individual 
identity, or, as Justice Brandeis termed it, the “spiritual nature of 
man.”207 
Tribe also notes the identity-based concerns articulated by the 
Supreme Court in cases relating to vocation, travel, control over 
personal information, and appearance.208  After analyzing Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong,209 Tribe asserted that the state may not 
constitutionally “take away without clear and focused justification . . . 
a fair opportunity for an individual to realize her identity in a chosen 
vocation.”210 
Similarly, in his discussion of Shapiro v. Thompson,211 Tribe notes 
that travel may be valued both “as an aspect of expression or 
education, and . . . as a means of changing one’s place of residence 
and beginning life anew.  Both dimensions of personal mobility are 
important in fleshing out the notion of personhood . . . .”212  The 
“fleshing out [of] personhood” by  “begin[ning] life anew” directly 
implicates dignitary interests in the construction and maintenance of 
one’s identity.  Tribe moves on to discuss the individual interest in 
“controlling one’s informational traces” largely as a matter of 
“outward looking” privacy.213  He reviews a wide array of Supreme 
Court cases relating to “system[s] of governmental information-
gathering, information-preservation, and/or information 
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dissemination,”214 and argues that when such systems threaten the 
individual’s control over information about himself or herself, they 
implicate “a basic part of the right to shape the ‘self’ that one 
presents to the world . . . .”215 
Tribe is also critical of the tendency by most courts to reject 
constitutional challenges to state-imposed regulations of appearance, 
such as hair length and clothing.  He argues that “one need not 
regard a person’s hair length as fully equivalent to speech in order to 
perceive that governmental compulsion in this realm invades an 
important aspect of personality.”216  Tribe laments the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kelly v. Johnson,217 which upheld a police 
department’s regulation of officers’ hairstyles and expressed special 
concern for regulations that affect young people for whom “the 
freedom to shape one’s personality through appearance” is 
“fundamental.”218  In each of these areas, Tribe is elaborating 
constitutional doctrines that are ultimately grounded in a legal 
recognition not only of the general value of human dignity, but of its 
more particularized manifestation as it bears on maintaining the 
conditions necessary for individuation—the realization of one’s 
distinctive identity as a unique human being. 
Finally, and most obviously, constitutional privacy has become 
deeply identified with issues of control over one’s body and 
reproductive autonomy.  Here the issues of control over one’s body 
raised in Kelly are elevated to a higher level of significance.  If the 
literature on other aspects of constitutional privacy is extensive, the 
debates and discussions surrounding reproductive autonomy are 
seemingly endless.  I will attempt only a brief review of some key 
aspects of particular cases as they bear on legal interests related to the 
recognition, protection, and/or construction of identity. 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Griswold v. Connecticut,219 
striking down a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives or 
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counseling others in their use, provides a good starting point.  Citing 
such cases as Meyer, Pierce, and NAACP v. Alabama, Justice Douglas 
posited a general theory of privacy as a constitutional right by 
alluding to the “penumbras” formed by “emanations” from the more 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.220  Like Margalit, Justice 
Douglas clearly articulates a conception of privacy as a bulwark 
against humiliating and degrading state intrusions.  “Would we,” he 
cautioned, “allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”221  Indeed 
prior to the “emanations” from “penumbras,” Justice Douglas 
asserted that “we deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school 
system.”222  Justice Goldberg took up this theme in his concurrence, 
using the Ninth Amendment to cast “marital privacy” as an 
unenumerated “fundamental right” derived from the traditions and 
collective conscience of our people.223  Similarly, Justice Harlan found 
that the law violated “basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.’”224  These opinions construct privacy as a pre-political value 
basic to a decent society.  In this regard, the principles they invoke 
share a common genealogy with those first articulated by Warren and 
Brandeis.  Both types of privacy demand that the law recognize and 
protect the integrity of the individual. 
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,225 the Court used Equal Protection analysis 
to extend the safeguards of Griswold to unmarried couples.  The case, 
however, was really about the right to privacy, as was evident from 
Justice Brennan’s assertion in his opinion for the majority that if “the 
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a persona as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”226 
Finally, in Roe v. Wade,227 the Court extended the right of privacy 
to cover the regulation of access to abortion.  The Court held that the 
right to privacy was “fundamental” and encompassed personal 
decisions regarding abortion.228  Therefore, any state regulation of 
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abortion could only be justified if it served a compelling state 
interest.229  Although as a practical matter the right to abortion and 
access to reproductive health services have been seriously eroded in 
the years since Roe, the Supreme Court somewhat ambiguously 
reaffirmed the “essential holding of Roe v. Wade” in Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey.230  While rejecting Roe’s trimester framework and freeing the 
states to impose regulations on abortion as long as they do not 
impose an “undue burden” on the woman’s right of privacy, the 
unprecedented joint opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter nonetheless asserted that “regardless of whether exceptions 
are made for particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any 
woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her 
pregnancy before viability.”231  Ronald Dworkin praised the decision 
as a “clear endorsement of a basic right to free choice about abortion 
until the fetus is viable,” but he also cautioned that “we must not 
forget that . . . four justices announced themselves still determined to 
overrule Roe v. Wade.”232  One more vote could significantly alter the 
terrain of constitutional privacy as we have come to understand it 
over the past twenty-five years. 
In Bowers v. Hardwick,233 a case upholding the arrest of a 
homosexual man under a Georgia criminal sodomy statute, the Court 
set harsh limits on the right to privacy and personal autonomy. In a 
sharply divided decision, the Court refused to extend the right to 
privacy to cover acts of homosexual sodomy between consenting 
adults.234  Justice White’s majority opinion distinguished the earlier 
line of privacy cases, asserting that “no connection between family, 
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity 
on the other has been demonstrated . . . .”235  In the more recent case 
of Romer v. Evans,236 Justice Kennedy used Equal Protection analysis to 
invalidate an amendment to Colorado’s state constitution that 
forbade localities from enacting ordinances outlawing discrimination 
against homosexuals.  Although not expressly based in the 
jurisprudence of privacy, the Court’s assertion that “a State can not so 
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws” is grounded in a similar 
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concern to respect the basic humanity of all citizens.237 
William Parent criticizes both Griswold and Eisenstadt for their 
failure to adequately define privacy.238  The “right to be left alone,” he 
asserts, is too broad to be meaningful.239  He sees the intrusions 
involved in the cases as more offensive to liberty than to privacy.  Yet 
he argues against a retreat from the sort of substantive due process 
analysis found in the cases.  Rather, he advocates the need to develop 
“rigorous disciplined reasoning aimed at constructing credible 
criteria for distinguishing justifiable from unjustifiable forms of 
government intrusion.”240 
DeCew, in turn, challenges Parent’s claim that post-Griswold 
cases spuriously conflate privacy and liberty.241  She argues that 
Parent’s conception of privacy, because it simply involves personal 
information that is not part of a public record, is too narrow to 
encompass the true concerns of privacy jurisprudence.242  DeCew 
asserts that privacy encompasses “not only information but activity 
and physical access as well.”243  She allows for cultural variation in 
conceptions of privacy by characterizing “the realm of the private” as 
a function of certain “social conventions” that help establish 
“whatever is not the legitimate concern of others, where those others 
are individuals in tort cases, the government for constitutional 
claims.”244  This is all well and good, particularly the concern for the 
social construction of the realm of privacy.  But DeCew’s analysis 
leaves unanswered the question of legitimacy, how it is established, 
and which (and whose) social conventions count in determining it.  
This can only be done by considering explicitly how the courts have 
construed the nature of the harm(s) caused by invasions of privacy as 
a basis for elaborating specific reasons for why our culture has 
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historically valued privacy.  This brings us back to the question of 
human dignity and the integrity of individual identity. 
The concern for individual integrity has led many 
commentators, including Tribe, to characterize the right of privacy as 
articulated in Griswold and elaborated on in Roe as more a matter of 
personal autonomy than of privacy.245  Grant Mindle, however, has 
been careful to point out some differences between Brandeis’ 
“privacy” and Tribe’s “autonomy.”246  Regarding the first edition of 
Tribe’s formidable American Constitutional Law, Mindle asserts the 
following: 
to Brandeis, the right to privacy is the right to conceal elements of 
our being from society at large.  But to Laurence Tribe, his 
intellectual heir, privacy so defined is insufficient to guard the 
dignity of man.  In lieu of privacy, Tribe would speak of 
autonomy.247 
He argues that Tribe casts privacy more as a form of public 
expression—the right to control one’s public reputation.248  He 
identifies “the gulf that separates Brandeis’ approach to privacy” from 
Tribe’s by referring to Stanley v. Georgia,249 where the Supreme Court 
invoked the right of privacy to strike down a law that punished private 
individuals for possessing obscenity.  Mindle contrasts Tribe’s 
comment that upholding the statute in Stanley would have led “either 
to a flattening or a repression of Stanley’s inner self,” with “Brandeis’ 
determination to use the law to guard against the ‘lowering of social 
standards and of morality.’”250 
Mindle’s contrast is well taken and it is important not to elide 
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the real differences between various conceptions of the right to 
privacy.  But neither should we minimize the deeper continuities.  
Mindle’s conclusion that Brandeis articulated the right to privacy “to 
guarantee the right of the individual to retire from public life, at least 
temporarily, and having done so to seek solace and spiritual renewal 
within the confines of his domestic circle,”251 is not inaccurate so 
much as it is narrow and limited.  Such concerns did animate 
Brandeis’ immediate efforts, but his understanding of the law as a 
living, growing thing led him to place far more emphasis on the 
deeper principles of recognizing and protecting the dignity and 
integrity of the individual’s persona or “spiritual nature.”  Similarly, 
Mindle’s assertion that Brandeis’ vision of privacy (as thus 
characterized), “is a far cry from what privacy has come to mean—the 
right to behave in public with little if any regard for the feelings of 
others,”252 seems to reduce contemporary concerns for autonomy to a 
species of ill-mannered narcissism.  Mindle’s view of autonomy 
overlooks continuing and vibrant (if occasionally eclipsed) concerns 
that share, in modified form, Brandeis’ concerns for dignity and 
individual integrity.  Indeed, one might argue that autonomy matters 
to Tribe (and others) precisely because it is viewed as central to 
sustaining the type of distinctive, unique individual that Brandeis too 
sought to protect.  Brandeis’ normative ideal of a cultured, genteel 
individual might not comport well with Tribe’s defense of Stanley, but 
each in his own way sees privacy as a means to protect not only the 
individual but also individuality—individual identity—from being 
standardized, repressed, or effaced by the forces of modern life, be 
they social, economic, or governmental. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of privacy, thus, resists any bright-line treatment, 
such as that given by other commentators and the courts.  Their 
diverse stratification of privacy between differing spheres and 
differing definitions is not the fault of the individual critics or judges.  
I am not suggesting that privacy is an amorphous concept, which 
constantly resists typical classification and definition.  Any attempt to 
bind privacy into one sphere is resisted by its application to another.  
Attempts to classify and define the right to privacy are, thus, defeated 
by the underlying needs to diversity and split the concept so as to 
make it less broad. 
First, existent literature on the subject sub-textually points to a 
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definition of privacy that protects the person from the intrusive 
nature of the (external) market.  Privacy has evolved into a 
mechanism for defining identity beyond the forces of the 
marketplace.  Commentators should, therefore, consider privacy with 
means outside the normative descriptions of property.  As a matter of 
normative conception, then, privacy is the social mechanism for 
protection of the individual from intrusion, and not merely the 
descriptive means for the protection of an individual’s rights in 
property. 
Despite critical attempts to dissect the concept of privacy along 
conceived lines of dignity, individuality, and spatial relations, privacy 
should not be considered as a fragmented reality.  Rather, it is best 
considered as one combined theory of social interaction with the 
marketplace.  Privacy is, thus, not a collection of diverse theories of 
societal interactions between differing spheres, but rather a unifying 
principle that is itself the means for creating the notions of dignity 
and identity that critics often use in defining privacy. 
Finally, privacy is best thought of as part of a larger continuum 
of rights.  It is not an encompassing sphere, but rather a point along 
a line, that is free to move between the normative and descriptive, as 
well as between concepts of identity and dignity.  Privacy should not 
be conceptualized as the mere means of protecting property, but as a 
tool for formulating identity.  Critics would be better served by 
formulating individual points along that line, than attempting the 
unduly broad and onerous task of providing one sweeping definition 
of privacy. 
